|M.Sc Student||Kerbs Ron|
|Subject||Experimental Analysis of Choice of Routes in Congested|
|Department||Department of Industrial Engineering and Management||Supervisor||ASSOCIATE PROF. Reshef Meir|
|Full Thesis text|
Congestion games are games in which the player's utility or cost is dependent on the number of players who choose the same resource. Examples of such situations are traffic jams. This research deals with applying state of the art models on data collected in games of congested traffic networks. The main purpose of the research is to predict people behaviors in specific situations, in particular congested traffic networks. The main challenge is to predict individual behavior with high accuracy, a task which has not been accomplished with good accuracy so far.We tried to check whether some new theoretical models, which were invented in order to describe risk averse behavior, describe the results of practical experiments. This research shows that players tendency to play a more group contributing strategy, that helps the players as a group, decreases as players payoff and the number of other players who cooperate with that strategy decreases. Moreover, we showed that after a certain level
of perceived losses, a player is very unlikely to return to the pro-social strategy. The wider implications of the study emphasize that even a small part of the group may change the whole group behavior for the worst.