|M.Sc Student||Berkowitch Ziv|
|Subject||On Routing Games and Net Neutrality|
|Department||Department of Electrical Engineering||Supervisor||Professor Ariel Orda|
|Full Thesis text|
The Net Neutrality debate involves many arguments for and against selective blockage of the traﬃc of certain users over the Internet. Public discussions, opinion articles and economics reports, all are common as a results of (and sometimes even leading to) laws and regulations, which are updated frequently. Our goal is to present a theoretical study that examines partial blockage of users under social welfare considerations, using game theoretic tools. Speciﬁcally, we consider a non cooperative routing game, where each user optimizes its own performance, by controlling the routing of its given ﬂow demand, regardless to the social welfare.
We analyse the eﬀects of constraints over the network users, considering the fundamental load balancing game of routing over parallel links. First, we focus on non-atomic routing games and show that forcing users to ship their demand on a set of superior links cannot decrease the system cost. We then focus on congestion-prone performance functions and linear performance functions. For these, we provide measurable techniques to improve the system cost by limiting some users to a set of inferior links. We also extend our results to the framework of atomic splittable routing games in two settings. The ﬁrst is that of a two-links system; the second is a system in which both the allowed and forbidden sets of links are composed by identical links. We show that, similarly to the non-atomic scenario, the system cost cannot be improved as a result of limiting users on a set of superior link(s). We present a detailed analysis for a general L-links system and show that in the case of two users, and for few system’s conﬁgurations the system cost cannot be improved as a result of limiting a single user on the most superior link.