|Ph.D Student||Deutsch Yael|
|Subject||Allocation Problems in a Competitive Environment -|
|Department||Department of Industrial Engineering and Management||Supervisors||Professor Boaz Golany|
|Mr. Uriel Rothblum (Deceased)|
|Full Thesis text|
Inspection is an ever present element in our life, and the need for it is raised in many real-world and scientific scenarios, e.g., in arms control and disarmament, in political science and economics, in insurance.
In most inspection scenarios, there is an inspection authority who wants to verify that potential violators comply with the rules and regulations that were agreed upon, whereas the potential violators are interested in violating them, i.e., the inspector and the potential violators have opposing preferences.
The inspector's resources are usually restricted, so that the inspection procedure can only be partial. Further, there are cases when the inspection is also limited by the rules of a signed treaty. It is assumed that the inspector and the potential violators are rational, and that they choose their actions strategically. Hence, these scenarios are best described by non-cooperative game theoretic models.
Five different parametric inspection games are developed in this thesis. For each of these games, efficient algorithms and methods to determine some or all Nash equilibria solutions of them are provided.
Analysis of the equilibrium solutions of the different games reveal interesting phenomena, such as: Non-monotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; values of the inspector's global resource in which the potential violators increase their cooperation although they are inspected by the same amount of resource; situations when the inspector has incentives to induce violation, and more.