|Ph.D Student||Albert Gila|
|Subject||Evaluation of a Toll Payment on a Congested Road System|
|Department||Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering||Supervisor||Professor David Mahalel|
The research focuses on an evaluation of a toll payment on one path of a congested road system. It describes the decisions of the parties involved in this system: the users, the initiator who built and operates the road, and the authority responsible for its management.
The effect on the user is estimated by the willingness to pay a toll for driving a passenger car in times of congestion. The user aims at maximizing utility while traveling on the congested road. Utility is mainly affected by travel time; and during congestion, the user has difficulties in estimating this component. When a toll is imposed, the problem becomes even more complicated: not only does the driver have to pay an “out of pocket cost”, but also this payment is unable to assure a specific travel time.
The research methodology analyzes this problem with the aid of microeconomic tools. The main emphasis is on developing suitable tools to evaluate the user-utility function in this situation. The travel demand curve is described in detail.
The effect of the toll on the initiator is evaluated in terms of revenue. The initiator aims at maximizing profit by levying a payment. Profit is affected by the user’s choice, but user utility is affected by the initiator’s decision. Because of these mutual effects, a game theory model is suggested. The model describes a strategic form game between the user and the initiator (the players in the game). The game solution is defined according to Nash equilibrium requirements.
The authority responsible for managing a congested transportation system wishes to reduce its negatives effects. The research relates to the need for the authority’s intervention. The authority is able to influence both the user’s and the initiator’s decisions in order to attain a better system equilibrium.