Subject: Subject Sylbus: Social Choice and Preference Aggregation - 096578 (Current)

Social Choice and Preference Aggregation - 096578
Credit
Points
2.5
 
Given In
Semester
a
 
  Lecture Exercise Laboratory Project or
Seminar
House
Work
Weekly
Hours
2 1     3

Determination of the grade according to progress during the semester and the submission of the final thesis


Prerequisites: Probability (Ie) 094411
or Probability (Advanced) 094412
or Probability (Ae) 094417
or Int.to Probability and Statistics 094481
or Introduction to Probability H 104034
or Probability Theory 104222


Axioms of Social Choice: May S Theorem, Common Voting Rules, Pagerank, Condorcet S Paradox and Arrow S Theorem. Voting Rules as Maximum-Likelihood Estimators. Preference Structures: Single-Peaked and Combinatorial Preferences, Generative Models with Ground Truth (Placket-Luce) and Without (Urn). Strategic Voting: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, Complexity Barriers and Vcg, Equilibrium Models, Heuristics, Iterative Voting and Convergence.

Learning Outcomes
At the End of the Course the Students:
1. Will Know to Understand the Conceptual, Computational, and Strategic Challenges of Aggregating Preferences.
2. Will Be Able to Spot Problems and Underlying Assumptions of Known and New Voting Mechanisms.
3. Will Be Able to Choose and/Or Design An Appropriate Mechanism for Aggregating Preferences in Various Contexts.


Timetable to semester 01/2019 2019/2020 Winter Semester
RoomBuildingHourdayLecturerExercise
Lecture
no.Registering
Group
214נהול09:30-11:30MondayDoctor Meir ReshefLecture1011
424בלומפילד11:30-12:30MondayDoctor Meir ReshefExercise11


Textbooks
PublishedPublisherAuthorsBook
2016cambridge university pressf. brandt, v. conitzer, u. endriss, j. lhandbook of computational social choice

Created in 05/12/2019 Time 18:56:06