Social Choice and Preference Aggregation  096578





Lecture 
Exercise 
Laboratory 
Project or Seminar 
House Work 
Weekly Hours 
2 
1 


3 

Determination of the grade according to progress during the semester and the submission of the final thesis
Prerequisites:
    Probability (Ie) 
094411
 

or
   Probability (Advanced) 
094412
 

or
   Probability (Ae) 
094417
 

or
   Int.to Probability and Statistics 
094481
 

or
   Introduction to Probability H 
104034
 

or
   Probability Theory 
104222
 
Axioms of Social Choice: May S Theorem, Common Voting Rules, Pagerank, Condorcet S Paradox and Arrow S Theorem. Voting Rules as MaximumLikelihood Estimators. Preference Structures: SinglePeaked and Combinatorial Preferences, Generative Models with Ground Truth (PlacketLuce) and Without (Urn). Strategic Voting: GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem, Complexity Barriers and Vcg, Equilibrium Models, Heuristics, Iterative Voting and Convergence.
Learning Outcomes
At the End of the Course the Students:
1. Will Know to Understand the Conceptual, Computational, and Strategic Challenges of Aggregating Preferences.
2.
Will Be Able to Spot Problems and Underlying Assumptions of Known and New Voting Mechanisms.
3.
Will Be Able to Choose and/Or Design An Appropriate Mechanism for Aggregating Preferences in Various Contexts.
Timetable to semester 01/2019
2019/2020 Winter Semester
Room  Building  Hour  day  Lecturer  Exercise Lecture  no.  Registering Group 

214  נהול  09:3011:30  Monday  Doctor Meir Reshef  Lecture  10  11 
424  בלומפילד  11:3012:30  Monday  Doctor Meir Reshef  Exercise  11 
TextbooksPublished  Publisher  Authors  Book 

2016  cambridge university press  f. brandt, v. conitzer, u. endriss, j. l  handbook of computational social choice 
Created in 05/12/2019 Time 18:56:06