|M.Sc Student||Koren Alexander|
|Subject||Iterated Deletion of P-Dominated Strategies in Discrete|
|Department||Department of Industrial Engineering and Management||Supervisor||Professor Aharon Ron Lavi|
|Full Thesis text|
In Game Theory, Iterated Deletion of Dominated Strategies is often used to simplify complex games. In some games, it provides a unique outcome for each of the participating players. In this study, we show its implementation in discrete position and VCG auctions, focusing on the linkage between Nash equilibrium strategies in position auctions and the outcome of the deletion process. We set up an adjusted discrete position auction with n players and 2 slots and delete dominated strategies according to players' beliefs. We then try to similarly apply iterated deletion to complex general cases. We conclude that the Nash equilibrium strategies are the unique outcome of the deletion process in the special case, whereas in general cases there is no unique outcome.