|M.Sc Student||Gozes-Sharvit Inbal|
|Subject||Realization of Human Rights in Statutory Planning in Israel|
|Department||Department of Architecture and Town Planning||Supervisors||Professor Hubert Law-Yone|
|Mr. Avigdor Feldman|
Planning is usually envisioned as an administrative instrument used by the government to impose concessions upon individuals, in favour of the public interest. This is a view often encountered in studies of planning laws. Numerous studies deal with the dilemma of the public interest versus the individual's right to property. Thus, planning is conceived as an interference with the realization of human rights.
In this study we intend to establish that the relationship between planning and human rights can be posited differently. We claim that the aim of planning is the realization of human rights accomplished by translating the abstract ideas into concrete actions and deeds. Our proposition is supported by theories of human rights according to which human rights form a body of negative freedoms and positive rights. Planning realizes human rights in the sense that it is charged with the realization of significant aspects of these positive rights. This is evident in the evolution of planning law from its inception to its present state. In Israel, this relationship is echoed in the proceedings of the Israeli legislature and in the contents of the list of issues which are subject to planning by law.
In view of this position we examine the extent to which statutory planning in Israel realizes human rights. More specifically, we analyze the implications to planning of one human right - the right to freedom of movement. This right is composed of four constituents of which we choose to deal with two: the freedom of movement and the freedom of residence. The positive aspect of realizing the right is expressed through population distribution plans and the plans for infrastructure pertinent to transportation. We examine national and regional statutory plans and ask whether their goals and means are compatible with these rights.
We find that the plans are only partly compatible with these rights. The goals of the plans, by and large, match the purpose of realization of the freedom of movement. We find two kinds of important infringements. One is negligent planning. This infringement is caused when the plan's instructions are inconsistent with the needs of the population. The other kind of infringement is discriminatory planning. This kind of planning provides for certain government incentives which are restricted to one segment of the population only (Jews).
On the basis of our findings we suggest that a normative device will be developed to provide a standard by which all statutory plans could be examined in order to assure adherence to the principal purpose of planning - the realization of human rights.