|M.Sc Thesis||Department of Industrial Engineering and Management|
The cognitive psychology literature has long ago acknowledged that people tend to find regularities and detect “cyclic patterns” even when they do not necessarily exist. Sonsino (1997) shows that myopic agents that recognize cyclic patterns in the observed history of repeated games converge with probability 1 to the collection of equilibrium-patterns in a large class of “simple games”.
In this thesis we analyze the repeated play of a modified (asymmetric) Battle of the Sexes game from the perspective of strategic pattern recognition. In the experiments, 202 pairs of students were asked to play the game repeatedly for 30-40 rounds in a computerized laboratory. Half of the pairs were introduced to each other and asked to chat for 5 minutes before the beginning of the experiment; the other half played the game under conditions of anonymity. All pairs were of mixed gender. In half of the cases, the superior role was assigned to the male; in the other half the superior rule was assigned to the female.
Some of the main results are:
(1) subjects demonstrate regard to their partners by breaking their favorite equilibrium-patterns.
(2) subjects’ overall performance in repeated game strongly depends on the strategy profile played at the first round of the game.
(3) subjects that insist on teaching their partners to play their chosen pattern, pay a price in the sense of obtaining a lower payoff in the experiment.
In addition, we find that subjects' cooperative inclinations are significantly weaker with anonymous matching and that female-subjects are more affected by social distance than males.